Defending the objectivist state of Israel
The Israeli military failure is second only to its economic one. Indeed, in 130 years of Zionism we have managed to establish a state. However, it seems that we (I know that “we” is not a valid objectivist word. What I mean here is “those individuals who chose to care of the future of Israel”) have managed to pay the highest price possible. As of today, Israel is completely incapable of defending itself, its PM is willing to divide its capital and a 3rd Intifada is underway.
How have we got here?
The military problem of Israel emerges from the following two causes: the state’s monopoly on defence and the obligatory draft.
These two approaches were born in the beginning of 19th century Europe (Napoleon is said to have his initial victories due to a draft, and Prussia managed to win him due to a centralized military effort). The European initiative has won Prussia the war of 1870, but has also failed each and every European empire in WWI and certainly in WWII. These empires flourished in the age of private armies; they completely failed at the moment they tried an obligatory draft.
Israel never even bothered to these principles (aside two cases, I will discuss them shortly). The Zionist movement turned into Socialism in the 1920s. The military disasters of 1921 and 1929 resulted in an organized military power. This power was managed by the Zionist movement, and fought not only the enemy, but other Israeli military organizations who chose to act on their own. The socialist army had its finest hour in 1948, where it killed 14 Israeli soldiers of a private army (the “Irgun”), and suffered 6000 casualties in a war that should have been a walk in the park, losing the majority of battles throughout this war.
The Israeli government had tried to create a military force outside the IDF as soon as in 1953. This force was unbelievably successful. However, plain collectivist politics called for its assimilation within the IDF and completely destroying it. In 1970 there was a second try – from within the army itself – that was destructed through an assimilation of this force into other units of the IDF.
The IDF suffered an increasing toll of casualties. This has caused the Israeli society to resent the IDF altogether and to object any Israeli ambition to take responsibility on its international affairs (Winning the conflict with its neighbours, that is).
In 1982, Israel has sent its army into Lebanon, chasing several tens of thousands of Arafat’s terrorists. Hell broke loose. The Israeli public was openly against this war. Moreover, the poor conduct of the IDF in the battlefield caused the Israeli public to refuse to win the Intifada of 1987. There is a war, the public didn’t deny, but instead of failing in the battlefield, they offered to try to make piece with the enemy.
Then came Oslo, and the reset is history. As of today, Israel consistently fails in each and every military purpose it aims to achieve.
(This was an absolutely brief survey of our military history, if you want me to emphasis on any part of it, just ask.)
Now, it is obvious that Israel can’t just reset its army, start it all over, and anticipate its enemies to sit still. We do need a constant capability of defence. This is why I don’t call for an immediate abolition of the IDF.
I call for the privatization of the military power in Israel and the abolition of the compulsory draft, though. So, I think that Israel should let out parts of its defence tasks to private contractors. I’m willing to take Gaza on me. The IDF spends there 1.5 Billion NIS a year (around $M500). I’m willing to generate better results for 10% of this price. Don’t get me wrong, Gaza is going to look like Dresden 1945 (or Tokyo…). This is how a war looks like.
Little by little, Israel should dismantle the IDF, leaving its defensive concerns to those who are willing to do something. “Those” can’t come from the ranks of the ever-failing IDF.




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