Avi Aharon

“A year from today, there will be no Hamas”.
How’s that for a prediction?
Well, in October 2000 I predicted that within a year, there will be no PLA.
As we all know, I was wrong.

Has anything changed in the past 9 years? During these 9 years Israel has been fighting a war it could have won in a month or two; these were 9 years of a war that got Israel to the worst recession in experienced in 4 decades (the last time Israelis just didn’t buy any apartments was in the 1965 recession).
Hamas generously provides a casus beli. That’s true. It’s always a good thing to have your enemy doing some of your job. The new Silkworm it possesses can reach Tel Aviv. With a little luck, a single missile can send the entire Gush Dan area to shelter, wiping out several business days just like that. Don’t mention the casualties, of course. Several dozens of them, for sure.

So Israel has each and every right to get rid of Hamas today. Wipe it completely out from the map. But does Israel have he capability of doing so?
In October 2000, Israel failed across the entire theatre. The IDF had lost one battle after the other. It was helpless against the PLA.
Contrary to the IDF, the Israeli police has won the battle of the galilee (in which Palestinian Israeli citizen blocked several highways in the north part of Israel) but lost in court. Lost in an Israeli court, that is. Yeap, the Police general who ordered to open fire on these Palestinians, had 13 of them killed and won the battle within a day, was kicked out of the police because he shot Israeli citizens. Clearly, no one wants to win a battle only to find himself in court. This – among other reasons – is why Israel is losing the war so far: Israel has chosen to lose.
What about other reasons for the almost-decade long lose?
Israel has tried to engage the PLA (including Hamas) several times. In operation Defense Shield (April 2002) its army conducted five battles, failing in one (Jenin). The low-quality IDF infantry has lost 13 soldiers just like that. The Israeli public has shown that it won’t stand so many loses, and the operation was halted. A week later, an invasion to Gaza was cancelled for this very reason: the IDF feared of having more casualties.
The reality of war is that fear of casualties only brings more of them, so in 2006 Israeli suffered some 200 of them. The IDF infantry was even worse than it was in 2002 (who says it progresses nowhere…), proving that Israel is incapable of occupying land.

Between 2006 and 2008 Israel has made a bold move. It didn’t bother to fix its Infantry. The land moves in operation Cast Lead were as poor as they were two years before: no gain of land, no advancement, and – probably most importantly – no gain of confidence among the soldiers.
However, Israel has improved its air capabilities. Hamas is following Hezbollah and Fatah in fighting an asymmetric war, and Israel has retaliate in an asymmetry of its own: I suspect that the IDF land forces were only a mask. Sure, they were fully mobilized, burning lots of diesel fuel and shooting lots and lots of projectiles. This was a cover for the introduction of the new air capabilities. In 4 minutes, over 100 plains (mostly unmanned? I believe so) got some 200 Hamas combatants killed.
Nice, isn’t it?
A basic axiom in the symmetric warfare is that in order to gain land you must have land forces. Israel seems to be breaking this axiom. It took Israel some 9 years to do so. The price is way too high for my taste. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the next war will be the Hamas last war.
I am thankful for Hamas for acquiring the Silkworm missile.